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6.1  Introduction 
There has been an increasing amount of criticism from both inside and out- 
side Japan  about the efficiency of the Japanese  distribution system and  the 
difficulty in obtaining access to the Japanese import market. According to this 
criticism, the  Japanese  distribution  system  is  quite  complicated,  Japanese 
business practices are outdated,  the system is inefficient, and it leads to trade 
barriers. 
The following points are often made: (1) The Japanese distribution system 
has many small-scale firms, both wholesale and retail, and a multilayer struc- 
ture that  consists  of  many  layers  of  wholesalers.  (2) There seems to be  a 
strong linkage among the domestic producers, wholesalers, and retailers. It is 
not easy for new entrants, foreign or domestic, to penetrate the market. 
This paper concentrates on the economic mechanisms that underlie the Jap- 
anese distribution system and its business practices. In section 6.2, I present 
a rough overview of the system; in section 6.3, I discuss the theory of repeated 
and long-term transactions; in section 6.4, I analyze structural change in the 
Japanese distribution  system using apparel distribution as a case study; and, 
in section 6.5, I consider the issue of access to the Japanese market. 
6.2  The Basic Characteristics of the Japanese Distribution System 
Table 6.1 compares some characteristics of the Japanese distribution system 
with those of Western countries. This table shows that Japan has a large num- 
ber of shops, given its population,  and a smaller number of workers in each 
shop than Western countries do. 
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Table 6.1  Comparison of Distribution Markets among Major Countries 
Countries 
West  United  United 
Japan  Germany  States  France  Kingdom 
(1985)  (1985:3)  (1982)  (1986:l)  (1984) 
Retailers: 
Shop density: 
No. of shops/ 
1  ,OOO  km2 
No. of  shops/ 
population of 
10,000 




No. of  shops/ 
1,000  km’ 
No. of  shops/ 
population of 
10,Ooo 
No. of workers/ 
1  ,OOO  retailers 
No. of  workers 
per shop 
W/R  ratio 
4,311  1,636  205  1,018  1,406 
135  67  81  102  61 
3.9  5.8  7.5  3.9’  6.8 
1,093  505  40  290 
34  21  16  29 
85  309  196  285 
9.7  7.0  12.6  9.9’ 
4.2  1.8b  1.9  1.6‘ 
Source: Ministry of  International  Trade and Industry  (1988). Data: Annuaire statistique de la 
France, Statistisches Jahrbuch, Retailing Business Monitor, Statistical Abstract of  the  United 
States, Census of Business, and Commercial Statistics of  MITI. 
’1983. 
”1984. 
Table 6.2 shows the share of  the market that retailers in various countries 
have. In Japan there are few large-scale retailers and many small-scale retail- 
ers, called “papa mama stores” (shops run solely by family members). 
Another important characteristic of the Japanese distribution market is that 
goods go through many layers of wholesalers. To  confirm the existence of a 
multilayer structure, one calculates the ratio of the amount of wholesale trans- 
actions to the amount of retail transactions (WIR). The higher the ratio is, the 
more wholesalers are involved in transactions. The last column of  table 6.1 
shows the WIR ratio for various countries: it is distinctively high for Japan. 
Although there are some difficulties with using WIR as an index of multi- 
layer structure,’ other methods confirm this characteristic of the Japanese dis- 
tribution system (see Tamura 1988). 
I.  For  example, the ratio  covers transactions  in  both  consumption  goods and  intermediate 
goods. Since Japan imports many materials and intermediate goods and exports final goods, the 
ratio has a tendency to be high for Japan. 177  The Japanese Distribution System and Import Market 
Of  course, this does not imply that the entire distribution system is multi- 
layered. For some goods,  the distribution channel is  very  simple. For ex- 
ample, the distribution channel for bread is much more vertically integrated 
in Japan than in the United States. But there are more goods whose distribu- 
tion markets have a multilayered structure in Japan than in other developed 
countries. 
The dominance of the small-scale firms in Japan implies that the distribu- 
tion system is decentralized and not highly integrated vertically. Wholesalers 
play an important role in a decentralized distribution system. Therefore, the 
distribution system is multilayered.  Conversely, multilayering and the role 
played by wholesalers make it easy for small retail firms to enter the market, 
since they can use the wholesalers’ services. 
Various factors explain the dominance of small-scale firms in the Japanese 
distribution system. Governmental regulation protects small-scale firms, for 
example. They receive preferential tax treatment and a “Large Store Act” reg- 
ulates the establishment of  new  stores by  big retailers. Okuno-Fujiwara (in 
this volume) discusses how  the  act retards the establishment of  new  large 
stores. 
However, neither the size of firms in the distribution system nor the number 
of wholesalers involved in transactions implies inefficiency. Small or medium- 
scale firms do not dominate only the distribution market; they also dominate 
the manufacturing sector and are usually said to be the source of competitive- 
ness for the Japanese economy. The subcontracting system in the motor ve- 
hicle industry is a typical example. 
Table 6.2  Size Distribution of Retailers in Major Countries 
United  United 
Japan  France  Kingdom  States 
Year  (%)  (%)  (%I  (%I 
~~  ~~  ~ 
Share of  large-scale retailers 
(share in terms of the amount 
of  sales) 
The share of the number of 
small-scale retailers (share in 
terms of the number of 
shops) 
The share of the number of 
very small-scale retailers 
(shops run by  family member 
alone; share in terms of  the 
number of shops) 
1976  24.9 
1977 
1978 






30.0  57.8  51.4 
59.0 
31.1 
63.1  43.0 
( 1980)  (1977) 
41.5 
(1980) 
Source; Tamura (1988) 178  Motoshige Itoh 
One of the essential characteristics of  the Japanese system, both in manu- 
facturing and distribution,  is the network of large and small firms that coop- 
erate. It is a decentralized  system, characterized by what is called Japanese- 
style business  relations.  This is in contrast  to an  integrated system,  where 
complicated exchanges are conducted within large firms and transactions be- 
tween  firms are at arm’s length. This issue is discussed in greater detail  in 
section 6.3. 
Table 6.3  compares the distribution margin for consumption goods between 
Japan and the United States (this table is based on the results in Nishimura 
and Tsubouchi 1989). This table shows that the margin is not much different 
between  the two countries. The distribution margin includes not only value 
added of the distribution  sector but also intermediate inputs of the sector. If 
the Japanese distribution system were inefficient, we would expect the distri- 
bution margin to be much higher in Japan than in the United States. 
6.3  Bansactions in a Decentralized Distribution System 
For a decentralized distribution system to function properly, there must be 
communication  and  cooperation  among  firms  in  the  distribution  market. 
There are a variety of externalities among firms in distribution markets. This 
is quite different from a pure market exchange. In a pure market exchange, 
the quality  of  the products is known  to both  the  seller and the buyer,  and 
simple market transactions are possible. The only relevant variable for trans- 
actions in this pure market exchange is the price of the commodity. Commod- 
ities exchange in this type of system are said to be “standardized.” 
However,  commodities exchanged  between  retailers  and  customers  are 
often “unstandardized.” For example, with complicated home electrical appli- 
ances, the consumer’s utility depends to a great extent on the level of service 
that the retailer provides. These services include quick and appropriate repair 
and maintenance and the provision of appropriate information. These services 
may  be provided  by  firms that specialize in repair; if  that is the case, then 
retailers deal only with the commodity, and  it  is quite standardized.  But  in 
Japan in the past, most repairs and other services are provided by retailers. 
Table 6.3  The Distribution Margins in Japan and the United States (%) 
Japan  United 
States, 
1975  1980  1985  1977 
The distribution margin of  ...  36.8  38.6  35.7 
consumption goods  (30.9)  (33.9)  (35.1) 
Source: Nishimura and Tsubouchi (1989). 
Note; The figures in parentheses are the ones before correction was made by the authors 179  The Japanese Distribution System and Import Market 
Consumers expected  many  things of retailers,  and the relationship between 
seller and buyer was not simply a pure market transaction. 
In the case of home electrical appliances, manufacturers adopted a market- 
ing strategy of establishing a network of retailers to sell their products.  The 
largest manufacturer in this industry, Matsushita (known as Panasonic in for- 
eign countries), is reported to have about 27,000 retailers all around the coun- 
try specializing in Matsushita products. Other manufacturers adopted a simi- 
lar strategy. 
This strategy is basically what economists called “vertical restraints.” Elec- 
tric appliances  were very expensive  in the  1960s when the market was ex- 
panding  rapidly. For example, the price of an ordinary color TV set in the 
1960s was about 10 times as high as the starting monthly salary of a college 
graduate. Thus, consumers expected many services of retailers. As the litera- 
ture  on  vertical  restraint  makes  clear  (see, e.g., Williamson  1983; Tirole 
1988), manufacturers may or may not enhance consumer welfare, depending 
on the nature of the market and other elements. Thus, we cannot conclude that 
vertical  restraint  by Japanese  manufacturers  enhanced  welfare.  However,  it 
did become a barrier to entry. 
The distribution  channel for home electrical appliances has changed to a 
great extent in recent years, though. Products have become much cheaper, and 
quality is more reliable.  So discounters have emerged specializing in no par- 
ticular brand. This new distribution channel is also more profitable for manu- 
facturers. 
The  relationship  between  manufacturers  and  wholesalers,  and  between 
wholesalers and retailers,  is even farther from a pure market. Many retailers 
depend  heavily  on wholesalers  for collection  of  information  about  market 
trends and the availability of products.  They also look to wholesalers for fi- 
nancial services, quick and individualized delivery, and assumption of the risk 
for unsold  stock. In that sense, retailers do not buy a standardized product 
from wholesalers.  A similar argument can be made for the relation between 
manufacturers and wholesalers. 
One example illustrates how this type of coordinated transaction in the Jap- 
anese distribution system can provide good service for consumers. In the dis- 
tribution market for books, retailers can order any amount of books from the 
wholesalers,  and wholesalers can order any amount of books from the pub- 
lishers. All unsold books are returned to the publishers (this business practice 
is called henpinsei in Japan).* Thus, publishers assume all of the risk for un- 
sold books. 
Publishers  usually print thousands, or tens of thousands,  of volumes at a 
time for technical reasons. Without henpinsei-that  is, if retailers and whole- 
salers assumed the risk for unsold books-the  publisher would have to store 
2. There are some exceptional cases in which the retailers must commit themselves to purchas- 
ing books from the publishers. 180  Motoshige Itoh 
most of the books in its warehouse and wait for order from wholesalers. With 
henpinsei,  on the  other hand, the  bookstores'  shelves  store unsold  books. 
Without henpinsei,  consumers would not have direct access to as many books 
(they would have to order from catalogues). 
Because of  henpinsei, wholesalers  can provide quick delivery  service of 
any books ordered  from retailers.  It usually takes,  at most,  a week for any 
books ordered in a bookstore to be delivered. There are few wholesalers and 
many  publishers.  Therefore, the wholesalers  are in  a better  position  to re- 
spond to the orders from the retailers. 
Transactions in intermediate  goods are even more complicated.  For auto- 
mobile  parts, for example, there  is a subcontracting  system between  parts 
producers and assemblers.  In order to provide assembling firms with the nec- 
essary products, the parts makers probably have to make specific investments 
that cannot easily be applied to other uses (see, e.g., Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian  1978; Hart and Holmstrom  1987; Grossman and Hart  1986). In ad- 
dition, effective coordination of production between the assembling firm and 
the parts makers is extremely important (one example is Toyota's just-in-time 
system). Therefore, both sides must share information and coordination is not 
simply a matter of adjusting production  schedules; it also includes changing 
the parts themselves, creating new products, and improving old ones. 
It would be very difficult to carry out this type of transaction in a market 
based on explicit contracts. As pointed out by Williamson (1975), and also 
Hart and Holmstrom (1987), it would be nearly  impossible to draw up and 
agree on a contract that would cover any and all future contingencies. It would 
be even more difficult to implement such a contract successfully. Klein et al. 
( 1978) present an interesting study of vertical integration illustrated by Fisher 
bodies and General Motors. For many reasons (as stated in Itoh and Matsui 
1987), transactions in Japan are based on implicit agreements. 
Even a product like paper, which seems to be a typical standardized good, 
has transaction relationships  similar to those of automobile parts. Interviews 
with paper production technicians and with managers in newspaper publish- 
ing point to an important problem  regarding the transaction relationships in 
the  Japanese  distribution  system and  the  issue  of  access to the  Japanese 
market. 
For newspaper publishers,  who are under great pressure to meet deadlines 
as they try to get their newspaper printed, the cost of having paper tear in the 
midst of printing is extremely high.3  Therefore, it is important to obtain news- 
print paper that is highly resistant to tearing and is appropriate to the presses 
used by the publishers. 
Newspaper publishers buy newsprint from a limited number of paper com- 
panies on a long-term basis.  At fixed intervals, for example, once a month, 
3.  A person who works for a newspaper told me of his using taxi cabs in the middle of the night 
to deliver newly printed newspapers after a delay in printing. 181  The Japanese Distribution System and Import Market 
the publishers calculate the tear ratio and other figures for the paper purchased 
from each company. Even if  the results do not immediately affect how much 
will be purchased in the next period, they do provide a basis for long-term 
plans. Thus, the evaluation of each paper company is based on long-term per- 
formance and not affected by short-term disturbances. 
So called “face-to-face” competition may  actually be  more  intense than 
anonymous  market  competition.  According  to  a  technician  in  a  paper- 
producing company, a drop in the company’s rating puts intense pressure on 
technicians and provides an important motivation for product improvement. 
In spite of  the fact that imported paper is much cheaper than domestic pa- 
per, and the fact that the cost of paper constitutes a considerable portion of the 
total cost of  a newspaper, Japanese publishers are reluctant to use imported 
papers. Some publishers have now started using imported paper only for a 
limited purpose: for special editions, like the Sunday paper, which  are not 
under the same time pressure.  Still, imported paper represents less than 20 
percent of the total amount of paper used. 
6.4  A Structural Change in the Japanese Distribution System- 
the Case of Apparel 
When the distribution market is dominated by small or medium-scale firms, 
the market  will become decentralized. Three important factors explain the 
emergence of a decentralized distribution system: 
1. Downstream factors. Each shop serviced a few customers because the 
population was spread all over the nation, and people did not drive far to shop. 
(See fig. 6.1 for the pace of motorization in Japan.) Thus, shops in small local 
communities tended to generalize rather than to specialize. 
2. Upstream  factors. The manufacturing sector was dominated by  small or 
medium-scale forms, which had neither the ability nor the incentives to verti- 
cally integrate their distribution channels. 
3. Technological  factors. Telecommunication, computers, and transporta- 
tion were not well developed. 
These three factors have been changing gradually, and the Japanese distri- 
bution system is now changing structurally. Of  the three factors, the first is 
probably the most  important.  In this section,  I  only consider the effect of 
changes in downstream factors.  (Itoh and Matsushima 1989 deals with the 
other factors.) 
Japan has experienced a rapid increase in the number of automobiles in the 
recent past (see fig. 6.1). There has also been a drastic shift in population to 
urban areas, especially to Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya. 
In order to see how downstream factors affect the structure of the distribu- 
tion system, let us consider the case of apparel. Table 6.4  illustrates the typical 
structure of  an apparel distribution system in Japan. Traditionally, Japan had 
only type-I  distribution: retailers could not specialize in a limited number of 182  Motoshige Itoh 
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Fig. 6.1  The registration of motor vehicles in Japan 
Table 6.4  'ho  Wpes of Distribution System of Apparel Products 
Retailers  Department stores, local 
small shops 
The way goods are sold  A wide variety of goods 
Location  Traditional local shopping 
areas or near railway 
station 
The role of  wholesalers  Active 




Nationwide chain stores 





Suburban shopping centers, 
roadside, or railway 
station building 
Minor 
Simple market transaction 
products, because the population was spread out and people did not drive far 
to shop. Type-2 distribution emerged only after the number of cars increased 
and the population moved into urban areas, allowing retailers to specialize in 
a limited number of  products. 
Type- 1 retailers include department stores and small-scale retailers in local 
shopping areas. They depend heavily on wholesalers. The wholesalers (who 183  The Japanese Distribution System and Import Market 
often manufacture as well) play an active role in sales of apparel, particularly 
in the department stores. They also do pricing and arrange commodities. In 
one sense, the department stores only provide a location and clerks (some of 
whom are provided by wholesalers and manufacturers) to the wholesalers; the 
wholesalers  sell  their  products.  This  system  uses  henpinsei (the practice 
whereby unsold goods are returned to wholesalers) and the rebate system (ba- 
sically a nonlinear price system under which incentives are given to the retail- 
ers with high sales). In this sense, transaction relationships between retailers 
and wholesalers (and manufacturers) are far from simple market transactions. 
They involve implicit contracts and tacit negotiations. 
This system has its own rationale. A wholesaler, transacting with retailers 
in various regions, can enjoy scale economies for such activities as informa- 
tion collection and dead stock risk management. For small-scale local shops, 
it would be impossible to cover the risk of dead stock, and to collect informa- 
tion about market trends and the availability of  products. Fashion trends in 
apparel change quite frequently and rapidly. Even for department stores that 
sell a large variety of goods at a limited location, it is far better to use the 
resources of wholesalers. For example, it was reported in Nikkei Ryutu (which 
means distribution) Newspaper that the return rate (unsold rate) of female ap- 
parel in the department stores was more than 35 percent in 1988. Wholesalers, 
often much  more  specialized in  certain limited kinds of  commodities than 
retailers, have a comparative advantage for such activities. 
Type-2 retailers include nationwide chain stores (which specialize in partic- 
ular types of apparel), and large-scale nationwide supermarket chains (which 
carry general merchandise). The Idol chain, for example, specializes in chil- 
dren’s apparel and has about 200 shops all around the country. Each shop is 
very  small, only about 70 to  150 square meters. Thus, the chain can only 
specialize in limited types of commodities. For such specialized shops to be 
viable, there must be good transportation and a concentration of people within 
a metropolitan area. Because Idol sells the same types of products all over the 
country, the volume for each item is very large. Manufacturers supply Idol 
with customized products, according to its specifications. Wholesalers some- 
times are involved in the distribution of Idol’s products, but their role is much 
more limited than in the type- 1 example. Unsold products are not returned to 
manufacturers or wholesalers. 
Large-scale nationwide supermarket chains also use this distribution sys- 
tem. These supermarkets have more than a hundred branches all around the 
country and can enjoy economies of scale. They sell only limited varieties of 
commodities, and far fewer items than the department stores sell. Thus, it is 
easier for the supermarkets to cover the risk of  dead stocks and to collect 
information about products. Supermarkets need not depend heavily on whole- 
salers, and the relationship between supermarkets and wholesalers (and man- 
ufacturers) basically is a simple market one. Exchange is conducted on the 
basis of explicit contracts. 
Both systems are reasonable, and it is not clear which is the more efficient. 184  Motoshige Itoh 
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Fig. 6.2  The geographical structure of shopping areas in a typical local city 
That depends on many factors, including the types of goods being sold. The 
type-2 system might be more efficient for standardized goods, whose sales are 
quite stable and predictable. But this does not imply that the traditional type- 1 
distribution channel will disappear. 
Figure 6.2 is a shopping map of a typical local city. There are three shop- 
ping zones: the traditional shopping zone (the oldest one); the shopping zone 
around railway stations,  which  started about 60-70  years ago (department 
stores are the core of this zone); and the suburban shopping zone (which has 
large shopping centers and roadside shops). Consumers expect to find differ- 
ent kinds of shops and services in each shopping zone, and they use the zones 
accordingly. 
6.5  Access to the Japanese Market 
Japanese transaction relationships and the related distribution system are 
barriers to new entrants, not only foreign but also domestic. The existence of 
long-term transaction relationships implies that any new  entrants will have 
difficulty doing business with incumbent wholesalers or retailers, even if the 
new entrants’ products are cheaper than the competition’s. Vernon’s  (1966) 
product cycle theory-in  which the trade and production pattern of commod- 185  The Japanese Distribution System and Import Market 
ities differs considerably depending on which stage the commodities are in- 
provides an important insight to the Japanese problem. 
Consider the case of dishwashers, for example. In their early stages, dish- 
washers were far from being standardized. The size of the market for the prod- 
uct was still small, the product itself left much room for improvement, and 
there was considerable uncertainty about the future state of the product. 
The development process for dishwashers involved trial and error; there 
was  a lot of  interaction between the producers and the market (wholesalers, 
retailers, and consumers). Factories, far from being large-scale and modem, 
were more like laboratories. Also, the location of the factories was quite im- 
portant because the producers had to be close to the consumers to find out 
what they wanted. Thus, it was natural that dishwashers first appeared in the 
United States, where there was a strong potential demand for them. The price 
of  the product in that early stage was only one important factor for the pro- 
ducers. 
In  their later stages,  dishwashers became much more  standardized. The 
market for the product grew, and there was little room for improvement in it. 
At that point, production cost was the most important element for the produc- 
ers. They took advantage of  scale economies, built large, modem factories, 
and located them without regard to distance to the market. In  fact, if labor 
cost was very important, the factory would probably be located in a foreign 
country. 
For certain types of goods, this product cycle story can illustrate structural 
change in the distribution channel. Home electrical appliances, discussed in 
section 6.3, are a good example.  A large number of  home electrical appli- 
ances  are  now  standardized,  and  their  distribution  channel  has  changed 
greatly. As a result, it is now easy for foreign products to penetrate the Japa- 
nese market. 
Apparel does not have a product cycle like home electrical appliances. But 
apparel products can be classified into two types; type 2 is much more stan- 
dardized than type 1. Figure 6.3 illustrates the production route of a toddler’s 
trousers sold in the Idol chain. 
The reason why this one product goes through so many Asian countries is 
that each country has a different pattern of comparative advantage. The wage 
level is much lower in Vietnam than in Thailand and Hong Kong, but there 
are some stages in the production process of the good that cannot be handled 
in Vietnam or Thailand. It takes two to three months for this production pro- 
cess to be completed, and the Idol chain takes on all the risk of unsold prod- 
ucts. Therefore, it is vital for the success of  the system that the product be 
sold in large quantities. In this market, it is quite easy for foreign products to 
penetrate. 
However, it is easier for foreign products to penetrate a type-1 market if 
they are from a well-established brand.  In  the type-1 distribution channel, 
there is a strong linkage between retailers and manufacturers (and wholesal- 186  Motoshige Itoh 
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Fig. 6.3  The production route for toddlers’ trousers 
ers) that serves as a barrier to new entry. Efficiency of allocation and new entry 
are in conflict here. 
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Comment  David Flath 
There are three different concepts of inefficiency implicit in references to the 
“inefficient”  Japanese distribution system. One is regulatory  distortion:  the 
large-scale store law cartelizes department stores and protects small stores. A 
second  is disguised unemployment: the distribution  sector  is economically 
backward, intractably governed by tradition rather than economic calculation. 
And a third is monopoly distortion: manufacturers and wholesalers restrict the 
price and nonprice competition of downstream distributors, which results in 
contrived scarcities. 
The usual evidence that the Japanese distribution system is inefficient is not 
really evidence at all. The usual evidence is (a) the ubiquity of small stores; 
(b)  the complexity of wholesale distribution channels; (c) the wide practice of 
exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, liberal acceptance of returns, and 
customer  restrictions,  little impeded  by  Japan’s  weakly  enforced  antimo- 
nopoly laws. One may accept each of these characterizations of the Japanese 
distribution  system as true and still logically maintain the absence of ineffi- 
ciency  in any of the three senses listed before. This is the essence of  argu- 
ments that might be labeled the “revisionist” view. 
It0 and Maruyama present new evidence to the effect that value-added per 
worker, gross margin, and retailer and wholesaler operating expenses relative 
to sales and profits relative to sales are all lower in Japan than in the United 
States or Germany. Their reporting profit and expense ratios by kind of  busi- 
ness is probably a bit of overkill, especially for the wholesale sector because 
they make no adjustment for double counting in wholesale sales. The “gross 
margin,”  defined as percentage difference between  final price and producer 
David Flath is an associate professor of economics at North Carolina State University. 188  Motoshige Itoh 
price, is not subject to this bias. They find that this gross margin is in aggre- 
gate less in Japan than in the United States or Germany, and they cite other 
estimates in the literature that reach a similar conclusion. On this evidence Ito 
and Maruyama argue that inefficiency of the Japanese distribution system is 
not the cause of seeming differences in consumer prices between Japan and 
elsewhere. I think they are correct. But this is a much weaker claim than one 
that states inefficiencies either do not exist or that they lack economic signifi- 
cance. For instance,  the disguised-unemployment  sort of inefficiency would 
manifest itself  as overemployment of resources in the distribution sector so 
that services such as next-door delivery are provided to consumers at prices 
less than the true economic cost. This is annoyingly consistent with the evi- 
dence that Ito and Maruyama present.  And  Ito and Maruyama themselves 
assert as “plausible” that the large-scale store law and the vertical restraints 
do result in inefficiencies.  They interpret their own evidence as showing that 
any economic rents resulting from regulatory distortions and contrived scarc- 
ities are merely not shared by the distribution sector. 
I am left still curious about the actual significance of the large-scale store 
law and the alleged peculiarites  of Japanese manufacturers’ management of 
distribution channels. In the second paper,  Motoshige Itoh goes some ways 
toward evaluating the latter. By relating his discussion of the allegedly pecu- 
liar marketing practices of Japanese manufacturers to the broader literature on 
the economics of vertical restraints, Itoh makes an important point: practices 
like resale price maintenance,  customer assignment, exclusive dealing stipu- 
lations,  and tie-in  sales are not unique to Japan.  It is probably true that the 
antimonopoly  laws of Japan (as actually enforced!) permit wider application 
of vertical restraints than is the case in the United States. Penalties for violat- 
ing the laws are rather small, and the powers of Japan’s Fair Trade Commis- 
sion to gather evidence and initiate action are weak. But it is far from clear 
that allowing vertical restraints is more harmful to consumers than attempting 
to ban  them. There is a substantial body of scholarship associated with  the 
University  of  Chicago and with the University  of  California, Los Angeles, 
arguing that America’s  antitrust  laws have added to the costs of  marketing 
products and have not corrected monopoly distortions. In this view, the rela- 
tively permissive antitrust policy of Japan, and the correspondingly wide ap- 
plication of vertical restraints there, can be a hidden advantage that contrib- 
utes to the low distribution margins documented by Ito and Maruyama. 
Itoh makes the added point that even vertical arrangements that efficiently 
resolve problems in the marketing of products can nevertheless impede entry. 
But the reason entry is made less profitable and is impeded is that the arrange- 
ments lead incumbents to expand output, which lowers prices. Efficient verti- 
cal contracts, although they  may  indeed deter imports, cannot logically ex- 
plain why identical products have higher prices in Japan than elsewhere. 
My  final comments concern the large-scale  store law,  the  law  which re- 
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floor space in excess of a set amount. This law has been mentioned in several 
of  the papers presented in this volume. In  prefectures of  Japan with fewer 
department stores (on which the law has had the most impact) there are rather 
more of  other kinds of  stores.’ The elasticity of number of other stores with 
respect to variation in the number of department stores ranges from essentially 
zero in the case of drug stores to -  10% to -  20% in the case of food, liquor, 
and apparel. There are about five times more department stores per person in 
the United States than in Japan, which is certainly a reflection of  the law’s 
effects on numbers of  department stores. But according to the estimates just 
mentioned,  this  cannot fully  account for  Japan’s superabundance of  other 
stores, including food stores. That is, although the law clearly does protect 
small shop owners, there must be indigenous factors that favor a ubiquity of 
small  stores.  Having  a  proliferation of  stores makes  household  shopping 
rather more convenient and enables economies on household storage space 
and travel time but also adds to the costs of the retail sector. High household 
storage costs and the lack of  motorization mentioned by Ito favor the ration- 
ality of a distribution system with many small stores. But then shop owners, 
because of their numbers, become a powerful political force, and legislation 
is passed that exaggerates the natural tendency toward fragmentation and de- 
centralization of  the distribution sector.  Similar forces are operative in  the 
United States, but in an opposite direction. Indigenous factors in the United 
States, including motorization, have long favored larger stores. And, not co- 
incidentally, here in the United States,  laws including local zoning, which 
separates commercial and residential activity, have furthered the domination 
of large stores over smaller ones. The large-scale store law of Japan distorts 
the distribution system of  Japan and is a source of  economic inefficiencies. 
But the law itself is a reflection of the distribution system. 
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